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Introduction
Stanley Fish’s recently published Versions of Academic Freedom1 completes a
trilogy of books speciﬁcally devoted to the academic enterprise. The earlier
volumes in the sequence were Professional Correctness2 and Save the World on Your
Own Time.3 But academia is a topic to which Fish has returned repeatedly
throughout his career, and to appreciate his position fully a reader must also
consult parts of his other books, such as chapters 8-12 in Doing What Comes
Naturally4 and chapters 1, 2, 14 and 15 of There’s No Such Thing as Free Speech, and It’s a
Good Thing, Too.5 As well there is the chapter titled “What’s sauce for one goose:
The logic of academic freedom” that he contributed to Academic Freedom and the
Inclusive University6 and his articles “Holocaust denial and academic freedom”7
and “Academic Freedom: How Odd Is That?”8 Finally, many of his pieces
in the Chronicle of Higher Education and his “Opinionator” contributions to the
digital edition of The New York Times9 deal with academia and academic freedom.
Michael Robertson is an Associate Professor in the Faculty of Law at the University of Otago,
New Zealand.
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In short, this topic is a major theme for Fish, and should be considered as
seriously as his work in English literature and literary theory, or his work in
philosophy, politics, and law.10
Fish’s understanding of the academic enterprise is summarized in his
“three-part mantra: do your job, don’t try to do someone else’s job, and don’t
let anyone else do your job.”11 He believes that the academy is an institution
with a distinctive job to do, and that academic freedom is nothing but the
freedom that must exist in order to get that job done. On Fish’s account,
however, the job of the academy is much more limited than most people
suppose it to be. Many of the objectives that most people suppose academics
are trying to achieve turn out to be “someone else’s job” on Fish’s analysis,
and so academics should not be trying to do them. The limited scope of the
academic job means that academic freedom is similarly limited in scope. Fish
therefore describes his account of academic freedom as “deﬂationary”; he sees
it as letting the air out of a lot of the inﬂated claims and grandiose language
that characterize the conventional accounts of academic freedom.
Fish’s position identiﬁes two dangers for the academy. One danger arises when
academics are called upon to justify their work to outsiders. If the academic job
is limited, and the grander glamour projects turn out to be someone else’s job,
what arguments can academics use to persuade non-academics (governments,
parents, foundations) to fund the academy generously and then leave it alone?
Another danger identiﬁed by Fish’s approach arises when academics do not
maintain a strong sense of their distinctive job, and do not act forcefully to
defend their role as the people uniquely qualiﬁed to perform the job. What can
happen then, Fish warns, is that outsiders invade or colonize the territory of
academia and then proceed to advance very diﬀerent projects or jobs. (This is
the danger Fish is warning about in the last part of his mantra.) Therefore the
ability successfully to justify and to defend the academic job becomes crucial,
both for funding the enterprise and for keeping the barbarians outside the
gates. However, the logic of Fish’s analysis leaves only a few tools to perform
this justiﬁcatory task. At the end of this paper I will argue for one more. I will
also consider the implications of Fish’s position for legal academics and legal
education in particular.
Fish’s Account of the Academic Job
According to Fish, “[t]he academy is the place where knowledge is advanced,
where the truth about matters physical, conceptual, and social is sought. That’s
the job, and that’s also the aspirational norm: the advancement of knowledge
and the search for truth. . . . They are the ‘internal goods’ the ‘shared pursuit’
10.
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of which holds the community together.”12 So, “[i]f you’re not in the pursuitof-truth business, you should not be in the university,” he concludes.13 This job
distinguishes the academy from other institutions that have diﬀerent primary
jobs, such as achieving obedience to God’s commands, or making money, or
wielding political power, or healing the sick, or applying the law, and so on.
But this broad account of the academic job is soon qualiﬁed. It is not the truth
about any conceivable matter that is to be pursued by academics; rather, it is
the truth about matters that have been identiﬁed as worthy by the disciplinary
traditions housed within the academy. This limits the scope of the academic
job. The working life of an academic is shaped and structured by professional
concerns; it is not a free-ﬂoating search for truths about anything under the
sun. “There are many things to be true or false about, and not all of them fall
within the university’s sphere,” as Fish puts it.14 For him, “the idea of teachers
and students joined in an eﬀort to determine the truth of a disciplinary matter—the
interpretation of a poem, the causes of an event, the origins of a virus—limits
both the kinds of questions that can be asked and the answers that can be
appropriately given.”15
The idea of the academic as a competent member of a community of
credentialed professionals is absolutely central for Fish.16 To become a member
of this community, the academic undergoes a process of undergraduate,
graduate, and even postgraduate training and socialization. As a result, he
or she internalizes the values, methodologies, projects, and decorums of the
community. Indeed, according to Fish, the academic’s very consciousness is
structured and enabled by this training and socialization.17 This structuring
is evident when academics pursue their respective disciplinary truths by
engaging in teaching and research. When a fully embedded member of the
academic community engages in research, he or she naturally does so in a
manner that comports with academic standards of decorum, some of which
Fish makes explicit:
Researchers should not falsify their credentials, or make things up, or fudge
the evidence, or ignore data that tells against their preferred conclusions.
Those who publish should acknowledge predecessors and contributors,
12.

FISH, VERSIONS, supra note 1, at 131-32; see also id. at 10.
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FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 20; see also id. at 119.
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one-more-time-for-a-while/?_r=0 [hereinafter Fish, Closing Argument] (“But (and here’s the
rub) the truth you are in search of as a teacher must be an academic truth, not truth generally,
or the truth about anything and everything.”).
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provide citations to their sources, and strive always to give an accurate account
of the materials they present.18

When a fully embedded member of the academic community engages in
teaching, he or she introduces students to existing disciplinary projects,
methods, and materials, and seeks to turn them into fellow competent
members of the profession.
College and university teachers can (legitimately) do two things: (1) introduce
students to bodies of knowledge and traditions of inquiry that had not
previously been part of their experience; and (2) equip those same students
with the analytical skills—of argument, statistical modeling, laboratory
procedure—that will enable them to move conﬁdently within those traditions
and to engage in independent research after a course is over.19

An academic who does not abide by these decorums can rightly be disciplined
by other members of the community. Such lapses are normally instances of a
failure of socialization, that needs to be corrected. But in extreme cases the
academic may be expelled from the community. We shall see Fish argue that
tenure and academic freedom are not designed to protect those who have
turned their backs on the academic job entirely.
An academic can be induced to act in a manner inconsistent with the projects
and values of the academy because he or she has imported into the academic
context projects and values that belong to a completely diﬀerent enterprise.
As Fish would describe it, such an academic is trying to do “someone else’s
job,” not the academic job. Fish’s position is interesting because he classiﬁes
as “someone else’s job” many things that others would see as legitimate parts
of the academic job, and even the most important part. In New Zealand, for
example, the Education Act (1989) declares that one of the characteristics of a
university is accepting “a role as critic and conscience of society.”20 This statute
gives university academics a very special job to do that goes well beyond
honing disciplinary skills and pursuing disciplinary truths. This special job
requires them to become actors in the political process as it unfolds outside
the university. Similarly, Fish described the goals and obligations of academic
teaching in minimalist terms above, but it is very common for the mission
statements of American universities to describe much grander goals. Instead
of just inducting students into particular disciplinary traditions, a university
education is claimed to eﬀect a more radical transformation of the character of
the student. For example,
Michigan State’s statement promises everything. The university, it announces,
will produce “an eﬀective and productive citizen” who “contributes to
18.

FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 19.

19.

FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 12-13, 18-19; FISH, VERSIONS, supra note 1, at 10; Stanley Fish, Aim
Low, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, May 16, 2003 [hereinafter Fish, Aim Low].

20.
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society intellectually, through analytical abilities and in the insightful use
of knowledge; socially, through an understanding and appreciation of the
world and for [sic] individual group beliefs and traditions; ethically, through
sensitivity and faithfulness to examined values; and politically through the
use of reason in aﬀairs of state.”21

Fish also ﬁnds this ambitious job of character enhancement endorsed in books
like Educating Citizens: Preparing America’s Undergraduates for Lives of Moral and Civic
Responsibility,”22 Education’s End: Why our Colleges and Universities Have Given Up on
the Meaning of Life,23 and in a declaration issued by the presidents of nearly 500
American universities “on the Civic Responsibility of Higher Education.” It
called for colleges and universities to take responsibility for helping students
“realize the values and skills of our democratic society.”24
But for Fish, none of these grand and ambitious jobs is the academic job, and
university academics should not be attempting to perform them (for reasons I
will get to in the next section). The non-academic job whose pernicious eﬀects
within the academy most disturb Fish is partisan politics. In both teaching
and research, Fish insists, it is imperative that an academic professional should
refuse to engage in advocacy of substantive political or moral positions.25 “The
only advocacy that should go on in the classroom is the advocacy of . . .
the intellectual virtues, ‘thoroughness, perseverance, intellectual honesty,’ all
components of the cardinal academic virtue of being ‘conscientious in the
pursuit of truth.’”26 Instead of engaging in political advocacy, the duty of the
academic is to “academicize” any topic under investigation.
The imperative of academicizing says that when you bring a topic into a
classroom, detach it from its real-world context, where votes are taken or
policies urged or rallies organized, and insert it into an academic context where
inquiries into its structure, history, signiﬁcance and value are conducted by
21.

FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 12. See generally id. at 10-17, 54; Stanley Fish, Tip to Professors: Just Do Your
Job, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (Oct. 22, 2006, 10:39 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.
com/2006/10/22/tip-to-professors-just-do-your-job/ [hereinafter Fish, Tip to Professors] (“Of
course, before you can do your job, you have to know what it is. And you will not be helped
by your college’s mission statement, which will lead you to think that your job is to cure
every ill the world has ever known—not only illiteracy, bad writing and cultural ignorance,
which are at least in the ballpark, but poverty, racism, ageism, sexism, war, exploitation,
colonialism, discrimination, intolerance, pollution and bad character. (The list could be
much longer.)”).

22.
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Stanley Fish, Will the Humanities Save Us?, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (Jan. 6, 2008, 5:31
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means of the traditional methods (textual, archival, statistical, experimental)
of humanities, social science, and physical science scholarship.27

For example:
Even in courses where the materials are politically and ideologically charged,
the questions that arise are academic, not political. A classroom discussion of
Herbert Marcuse and Leo Strauss, for example, does not (or at least should
not) have the goal of determining whether the socialist or the conservative
philosopher is right about how the body politic should be organized. Rather,
the (academic) goal would be to describe the positions of the two theorists,
compare them, note their place in the history of political thought, trace the
inﬂuences that produced them and chart their own inﬂuence on subsequent
thinkers in the tradition. And a discussion of this kind could be led and
guided by an instructor of any political persuasion whatsoever, and it would
make no diﬀerence given that the point of the exercise was not to decide a
political question but to analyze it.28

Fish acknowledges “the objection that in many courses, especially courses given
at law school or by political science departments, the materials being studied
are fraught with political, social, ethical, moral, and religious implications.”
But he insists that the imperative to academicize does not rule out such
topics from the classroom.29 It mandates only that any topic be subjected to
the correct kind of analysis, and that this analysis not include answering the
question of whether or not a moral or political claim is true.
I am not urging a restriction on content—any ideology, agenda, even crusade
is an appropriate object of study. . . . If an idea or a policy is presented as a
candidate for allegiance . . . then the classroom has been appropriated for
partisan purposes. But if an idea or policy is subjected to a certain kind of
interrogation—what is its history? how has it changed over time? who are its
prominent proponents? what are the arguments for and against it? with what
other policies is it usually packaged?—then its partisan thrust will have been
blunted, for it will have become an object of analysis rather than an object of
aﬀection.30
27.

FISH, VERSIONS, supra note 1, at 31. On “academicizing” See also FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at
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Objections to Fish’s Account of the Academic Job
The most basic objection to Fish’s account of the academic job is that he has
failed to describe accurately what most academics actually do. Naomi Riley’s
book The Faculty Lounges . . . and Other Reasons Why You Won’t Get the College Education
You Paid For describes how very few of the academics working in the 4000
degree-granting colleges and universities in the United States are engaged in
pursuing new truths and advancing knowledge. In his New York Times piece
on her book, Fish notes her point that
“a signiﬁcant portion of [the] additional degrees that colleges have added in
the past few decades have been in vocational areas,” and those areas “simply
do not engage students in a search for ultimate truths,” but instead have prestipulated goals. “Do we need,” she asks, “to guarantee the academic freedom
of professors engaged in teaching and studying ‘Transportation and Materials
Moving,’ a ﬁeld in which more than ﬁve thousand degrees were awarded in
2006?”31

Security and protective services and business statistics are other examples
Riley provides of the types of courses that fall within her critique.
The thrust of Riley’s argument is that because many academics in colleges
and universities are not doing the true academic job, it follows that they
should not enjoy the tenure and academic freedom that the true academic
job requires. Fish’s response is that if many academics in colleges and
universities are not doing the true academic job, and are doing someone
else’s job instead, then they should either stop doing that non-academic job
or leave the academy and do it elsewhere. “I say, and have been saying for
years, that colleges and universities should stop moving in those directions—
toward relevance, bottom-line contributions and social justice—and go back to
a future in which academic inquiry is its own justiﬁcation.”32 Purely vocational
courses like “Transportation and Materials Moving” should be taught in a
vocational institution, such as a polytechnic or community college, rather than
a university.
Another objection is that Fish’s imperative to “academicize” is empty because
it is psychologically impossible. Nobody, not even committed academics, can
compartmentalize their strong moral and political and religious beliefs, and
put them to one side while they engage in academic practices.33 Fish’s response
is that human beings compartmentalize and contextualize in this way all the
time.34 “We understand . . . that proper behavior at the opera diﬀers from
31.

Stanley Fish, Vocationalism, Academic Freedom and Tenure, N.Y. T I M E S : O P I N I O N AT O R
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proper behavior at a ball game . . .. We refrain . . . from inserting our religious
beliefs or our private obsessions into every situation or conversation no matter
what its content.”35 He is not saying that we can detach ourselves from all of
our deep commitments; he is saying that the deep commitments that grip us at
any one time are context-speciﬁc and enterprise-speciﬁc. This is why he rejects
the claim that “one’s ethical obligations remain the same no matter where one
is or what one is doing or what one is being paid to do.”36 Consequently, it can
be
part of a teacher’s job to set personal conviction aside for the hour or two
when a class is in session and allow the techniques and protocols of academic
research full sway. This restraint should not be too diﬃcult to exercise. After
all, we require and expect it of judges, referees and reporters. And while its
exercise may not always be total, it is both important and possible to make
the eﬀort.37

He reports that he performs this compartmentalization without diﬃculty in
his own classroom practice:
I adhere to the distinction between pedagogy and political advocacy, and I do
so eﬀortlessly. I just go in every day and subject the materials to an academic
interrogation, an interrogation concerned with the structure of arguments
and the place of those arguments in a tradition of intellectual inquiry. Those
traditions are complex and richly layered, and attending to them seriously
takes all one’s energy. It never even occurs to me to turn the discussion into an
occasion for pronouncing on the political questions of the day, and because
the parameters of the discussion are so clearly set and so clearly academic, my
students know better than to introduce such questions. Set it up right and you
won’t go wrong.38

And other academics achieve this compartmentalization too. Fish describes
Noam Chomsky’s 2013 John Dewey lectures, given under the auspices of
Columbia University’s philosophy department, as a “master class” in which
the jobs of academic interrogation and political advocacy were kept separate,
even by someone who has well-known strong political views.39 On Fish’s
analysis it is perfectly acceptable for someone like Chomsky to have strong
personal political views, as long as he does not bring them into his lectures on
35.

FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 23-24.

36.

Fish, Always Academicize, supra note 27.

37.

Fish, Conspiracy Theories 101, supra note 29.

38.

Stanley Fish, Politics and the Classroom: One More Try, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (June 8, 2008,
6:57 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/06/08/politics-and-the-classroomone-more-try/ [hereinafter Fish, Politics and the Classroom].
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Stanley Fish, Scholarship and Politics: The Case of Noam Chomsky, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2013), http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/12/10/opinion/fish-scholarship-and-politics-the-case-of-noamchomsky.html?_r=0 [hereinafter Fish, Scholarship and Politics].
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philosophy or linguistics or even politics. Academics should pursue personal
political goals on their own time, not “on the university’s or state’s dime.”40
I am not counseling moral and political abstinence across the board, only in
those contexts—like the classroom—where the taking of positions on the war
in Iraq or assisted suicide or the conduct of foreign policy is extraneous to or
subversive of the activity being performed.41

A third objection probes the role of truth in Fish’s analysis. Fish says that
the academic job is to pursue truth, but how can he then say that it would be
wrong for a political theorist to investigate whether Marcuse’s or Strauss’s
position on how the body politic should be organized is more true? Fish
notes the similar objection that “if we compare Mill and Marx, the question
is not just why did they think what they did but which of them came closer
to the truth . . . about the way governments should be organized or [the]
truth about how people should comport themselves, politically and morally.”42
His response to such challenges is to apply the general point he made earlier:
“There are many things to be true or false about, and not all of them fall within
the university’s sphere.”43 He is not denying that political and moral truths are
important; he is just denying that it is the job of academics to ascertain these
truths as opposed to other truths.44
Consequently it would be inaccurate to say that Fish wants academics to
be neutral on political and moral questions while they are doing their jobs.
“With respect to political judgments, what I’m asking for is not neutrality,
but hands oﬀ. Don’t tip-toe around partisan issues; exclude them outright.
That’s not neutrality; it’s total avoidance.”45 Nor does Fish see neutrality as
an academic virtue when it comes to the truths that it is the job of academics
to ascertain. Here academics should not shrink from taking a strong stand;
rather, they should make an aﬃrmative judgment and defend it to the best of
their ability. So in response to the question “Are faculty allowed to call it as
they see it?” Fish replies: “If it is an academic question (what are the pro and
con arguments for assisted suicide and where in the history of morality and
philosophy do they come from?), faculty should indeed call it as they see it.
If the question is a partisan political one (is assisted suicide right or wrong),
faculty should stay away from it like the plague.”46
40.

FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 26.

41.

Fish, Always Academicize, supra note 27.

42.

Fish, Politics and the Classroom, supra note 38. See also FISH, VERSIONS, supra note 1, at 133.

43.

FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 34. See also FISH, VERSIONS, supra note 1, at 133-34.
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Fish, Politics and the Classroom, supra note 38; Stanley Fish, Stop Me Before I Write More, N.Y. TIMES:
OPINIONATOR (June 15, 2008, 7:02 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/06/15/
stop-me-before-i-write-more/ [hereinafter Fish, Stop Me].
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Stanley Fish, Buttons: The Sequel, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (Oct. 19, 2008, 9:00 PM), http://
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46.
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A deeper challenge to the role of truth in Fish’s analysis can be based on Fish’s
own commitment to anti-foundationalism. Critics of anti-foundationalism
say that because it holds that reality is socially constructed, it is compelled to
hold that there is no objective truth, and that all truths are relative. Given this
epistemology, how can an anti-foundationalist like Fish say that “truth is the
pre-eminent academic value, and adherence to it is exactly the opposite of moral
relativism”?47 In response to challenges such as those from John Searle and
Thomas Haskell, Fish repeats in Versions of Academic Freedom his long-defended
position that anti-foundationalism has no relativistic consequences at all.48
Explaining this position fully here would take me too far aﬁeld, but in essence
Fish holds that objective truth is untroubled by whatever epistemologists get
up to. In contexts outside philosophy seminars, both foundationalists and antifoundationalists quite properly ascertain what is objectively true by employing
the approved techniques developed by historically contingent traditions. Even
in the context of doing philosophy, Fish would argue that those who think that
what these human traditions deliver is epistemologically inferior or suspect
have been seduced by the impossible desire to experience reality as God does,
rather than as limited and embedded human beings have to.49
A fourth objection to Fish’s account of the academic job takes issue with
his separation of the academy and politics. The challenge advanced here is
that “politics is everywhere,” and so it is impossible to avoid it in the academy.
Everything is said to be political “because in any form of social activity there
are always alternative courses of action—diﬀerent ways of doing things—and
those diﬀerences will, more often than not, reﬂect opposing ideas of what is
important and valuable.”50 Fish agrees with this “politics is everywhere” claim,
but he describes it as “both true and trivial.”51 He accepts that disagreement
is pervasive, and because he does not believe that disagreement can ever be
authoritatively resolved (as liberals hope) by appealing to neutral principles
or universal reason,52 he concludes that politics, understood broadly as “the
realm in which competing agendas, reﬂecting opposing views of the way
things should be, ﬁght it out,” is indeed everywhere. “Deﬁned that generally,
the realm of the political is in fact coincident with the entire realm of human
behavior, and no activity escapes it.”53
Fish is therefore happy to acknowledge many ways in which the academy
inevitably involves politics in this broad sense, but he insists that this admission
does not preclude him from separating partisan politics from the academic job.
47.

FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 38.

48.

FISH, VERSIONS, supra note 1, at 25-29, 55-56.

49.

ROBERTSON, STANLEY FISH, supra note 10, at 16-47.
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This is because while politics is inescapable in life, politics will always take an
institution-speciﬁc form. Politics may be everywhere, but it is not everywhere the
same. “[T]he Tip O’Neill mantra—all politics is local—should remind us that
the content of the general category ‘political’ will vary with the local context
of performance.”54 That is, the particular matters in dispute and the decorums
governing the conduct of the dispute will vary with social and institutional
context. Politics in the broad and abstract sense precipitates out into many
diﬀerent kinds of limited and particular politics in human life. It follows
that the issues and decorums that characterize politics in one context cannot
simply be inserted into a very diﬀerent context. “[T]he fact that politics marks
every context of human action doesn’t mean that it is legitimate to import the
politics appropriate to one context into another which, while no less political,
will be home to quite diﬀerent politics.”55
Fish applies this lesson to partisan politics and academic politics.
Academic politics is concerned with disagreements over matters such as
which interpretation of a canonical text is correct, the courses that should be
taught within a department, the allocation of resources between departments,
the best form of departmental leadership, and so on. These matters do not
ﬁgure at all in partisan politics, which is concerned with disagreements over
which public policy should be advanced through legislation, who should be
elected, who should be made a judge, who should be able to vote, etc. Nor
do the acceptable ways of deciding disagreements in partisan politics, such
as using attack ads, leaking information about an opponent’s private life, and
forming political action committees, translate over to the academic political
context. Fish’s point is that academic politics and partisan politics are two
very diﬀerent things, and cannot be combined simply because they are both
instances of “politics” when that term is understood in a highly abstract and
general way. To the contrary, any eﬀort to combine them is confused because
it fails to appreciate that the academic job and the partisan political job are
completely diﬀerent. “My point is not that academics should refrain from
being political in an absolute sense—that is impossible—but that they should
engage in politics appropriate to the enterprise they signed onto.”56
Probably the most natural objection to Fish’s account of the academic job is
that it is too narrow. His professionalization of the academy limits researchers
to only those matters that the existing disciplinary traditions judge to be
important, but this constriction of the academic job is said to be improper
for epistemological and moral reasons. The epistemological objection is
that narrow professional categories are blinkers that prevent academics from
gaining a full understanding of their subject matter. If the blinkers were
thrown away entirely, or if the categories developed by diﬀerent disciplines
were all combined, then we could at last achieve comprehensive knowledge
54.

Fish, Stop Me, supra note 44.

55.
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of what we are interested in. Fish ﬁnds this objection being advanced by
those advocating “anti-professionalism,”57 “interdisciplinarity,”58 and “cultural
studies.”59 By whatever name it is called, Fish declares it to be the expression
of an impossible desire. His position is that human beings can exist only
embedded in local contexts, and so the bias and partiality (or blinkers) that
come with such embeddedness are inescapable. It is not possible for humans
to step outside all local contexts to achieve a transcendent perspective, nor is it
possible to combine all local contexts into one master context. Any being that
could achieve an apprehension of reality that is not a limited, local viewpoint
would have to be a god, not a human being. Socially developed categories,
whether professional or not, are therefore a precondition of our experience of
the world, not an impediment to a true experience of the world.60
So, for example, he identiﬁes one manifestation of anti-professionalism
as the desire for “public intellectuals” who can speak directly to the public
about intellectual matters without having to use the abstruse categories and
incomprehensible jargon of university academics.61 But Fish argues that the
“public intellectual” is not an intellectual who has escaped the constraints of
academic professional categories to communicate a less blinkered viewpoint
to the public. Instead the public intellectual has just exchanged the categories
and constraints of one embedded context for another.
In short, the public intellectual is another professional, practicing another
discipline and enacting a vision no more or less grand than the vision of any
other professional in any other discipline. The gospel of interdisciplinarity
depends on the possibility of performing acts that are more than locally
intelligible and therefore more than locally consequential. There are no
such acts, although, given certain political conditions, acts proceeding from
some local perspective can command the ﬁeld. This, however, will not be the
triumph of interdisciplinarity, but the triumph of one discipline or angled
project over all others.”62

The moral objection to Fish’s professionalization of the academy and
consequent narrowing of its focus to disciplinary concerns alone is that “even
if it is possible to set aside one’s political convictions when conducting a class,
it would be unworthy to do so because it would be a dereliction of one’s duty as
a human being concerned with the well-being of the world.”63 Fish is charged
with advocating “a hunkering down in the private spaces of an academic
workplace detached from the world’s problems,” a stance that “forecloses
57.
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the possibility of civic engagement and democratic action.”64 Rather than
pursuing mere disciplinary truths and distancing themselves from moral and
political substance by academicizing everything, academics should be using
their skills to advance larger goals such as social justice, or individual freedom.
They should be working to inculcate desirable values in their students such as
tolerance, or an appreciation of our Western cultural heritage.
We have already encountered one of Fish’s responses to this moral
objection: Academics have to refrain from seeking political outcomes only
while they are engaged in their academic jobs. On their own time they can
work for increased democratic participation or a reduced role for the state
as hard as they want. If an academic feels that this part-time response is
inadequate, given the magnitude of the problems facing the world, then Fish
advises that he or she “get out of teaching and into a line of work more likely
to address directly the real world problems you want to solve.”65 That is, if
you ﬁnd the academic job unsatisfying, go and do another one, but do not
remain an academic if you are not prepared to do the academic job. Another
response to the moral objection is that academics are not ignoring the world of
values when they stick to the academic job during working hours. Instead they
are advancing speciﬁcally academic values. “[T]he search for truth is its own
value, and ﬁdelity to it mandates the accompanying values of responsibility in
pedagogy and scholarship.”66 So he is “not saying that universities should be
unprincipled, but that the principles they adhere to and enforce should be the
principles appropriate to their mission and not principles that belong to other
enterprises.”67 Values and principles, like politics, are enterprise-speciﬁc for
Fish, and it is a mistake to think that they can be detached from one enterprise
and simply inserted into another.
But these two responses to the moral objection just nibble at its fringes. A
more adequate response must face it more directly, and Fish endeavors to do
this with six more arguments in which he claims that it would be wrong to
do as the moral objector asks and include in the academic job any more than
he has. The ﬁrst three of these arguments are relatively narrow in scope. One
is legalistic: An academic’s contract of employment covers only disciplinary
64.

Stanley Fish, Neoliberalism and Higher Education, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (Mar. 8, 2009, 10:00 PM),
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tasks. The academic job is “deﬁned . . . by contract and by the course catalogue
rather than by a vision of democracy or world peace.”68 Therefore if academics
take up these other jobs, they “abandon the responsibilities that belong to
them by contract in order to take up responsibilities that belong properly to
others.”69 The second narrow argument is tactical: Making partisan politics
part of the academic job could expose the university to danger from hostile
political actors. “[M]any who wished for increased public attention to their
labours got it in the past few years of the right-wing backlash and found
that, rather than bringing respect and inﬂuence, it brought danger and the
elimination of progressive programmes.”70 If academics want to protect their
pursuit of disciplinary truths from interference by legislators and trustees and
political activists, then they should stay well away from the partisan politics
job.
My contention is that if every college or university instructor were to hew to
this discipline . . . those who want to do our jobs for us would have no traction
or point of polemical entry because politics, or religion, or ethics would enter
the classroom only as objects of analysis and not as candidates for approval or
rejection. The culture wars, at least in the classroom, would be over.71

Fish’s third narrow argument is empirical: There is no evidence that academics
can do the job of improving the character of students.72 Fish doesn’t deny that
a particular student’s character and subsequent conduct might be aﬀected (for
good or ill) by taking a particular course. “But these are contingent eﬀects,
and as contingent eﬀects they cannot be designed and shouldn’t be aimed
at. (It’s not a good use of your time to aim at results you have only a random
chance of producing.)”73 “There are just too many intervening variables, too
many uncontrolled factors that mediate the relationship between what goes on
in a classroom or even in a succession of classrooms and the shape of what is
ﬁnally a life.”74 Therefore his “main objection to moral and civic education in
our colleges and universities is not that it is a bad idea (which it surely is), but
that it’s an unworkable idea.”75
Fish’s ﬁnal trio of arguments against those who would add other jobs to
his conception of the academic job all claim that these new jobs would lead to
the diminishment and ultimately the destruction of the academic enterprise.
Argument four is that “it is a requirement for the respectability of an enterprise
68.
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69.
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70.
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that it be, or at least be able to present itself as, distinctive.”76 That is, an
enterprise has to have a clear sense of what its special job is. But Fish believes
that if the moral objector’s many new jobs are added to the core academic job
of advancing disciplinary truths, it will no longer be clear that the academy is
distinctive. The core academic job will be subsumed and lost among the many
other jobs. The academy will be transformed into just another location where
people seek to advance jobs that originate outside the academy. “‘Narrow’ is
an adjective the academy should not shun but embrace, for if academic activity
cannot be narrowly deﬁned, it loses its shape and becomes indistinguishable
from political rallies and partisan exhortation.”77 Argument ﬁve is that some
of the moral objector’s new jobs cannot simply be added to Fish’s narrow job
because they conﬂict with it. Take achieving respect for diversity, for example.
Encouraging students to respect a diversity of interests, beliefs, and identities
leaves no space for the narrow academic job of engaging in “the evaluation,
not the celebration, of interests, beliefs and identities; after all, interests can be
base, beliefs can be wrong, and identities are often irrelevant to an inquiry.”78
Similarly, achieving “intellectual diversity” among university teachers advances
a political goal—more politically conservative professors on the university
staﬀ—at the expense of an academic goal.79 On Fish’s account of the academic
job the political allegiances of the professors are irrelevant because those
allegiances are never activated. It makes no diﬀerence whether the professors
are all Republicans or all Democrats if all they do is “academicize.” But if
professors are openly hired on the basis of their party aﬃliations, it legitimates
the injection of partisan party positions into their job performance, and this is
antithetical to academicizing.
Fish’s sixth and last argument is the deepest, and draws upon his
philosophical anti-foundationalism. A foundationalist holds that Reality has
its own characteristics and exists completely independently of the human
observer. The job of the human observer is to apprehend these characteristics
accurately, and then base any knowledge claims upon the foundation of this
independent Reality. An anti-foundationalist holds that we never apprehend
76.
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Reality directly; rather, we always apprehend it in a mediated fashion. What
mediates our apprehension is a background of socially inculcated beliefs,
values, categories, etc. This background both enables and structures our experience
of the world. So if the background changes signiﬁcantly, the world we
experience changes too.80 This has implications for the academic job and the
objects of academic study. If we take away the existing disciplinary categories,
the object of our disciplinary concern is not thereby revealed in its full glory,
as the earlier epistemological objection supposed. Instead it disappears. We
apprehend in its place a diﬀerent object made available by the new categories
and beliefs and values that have replaced the old disciplinary background (i.e.,
the ones that the moral objector favors). “When you exchange one activity for
another, you lose something, and although you might mask the loss by calling
the new activity by the old name, the phenomena that come into view under
the previous dispensation will have disappeared in your brave new world.”81
Because Fish the anti-foundationalist sees a move away from the narrow
conception of the academic job as involving the loss of the very things that
the established disciplines studied, and because Fish the academic sees value
in those studies, he strongly opposes any move that would change the narrow
academic job.
I am aware that the argument I am making here is a hybrid, perhaps even a
monster. I combine an antifoundationalist epistemology with an insistence
on maintaining a foundational structure that is, by my own admission,
artiﬁcial, historically emergent and, therefore, challengeable; and I do so in
the conviction that without such a foundation—supported by nothing but
itself—a certain mode of experience will be lost.82

Fish’s Account of Academic Freedom
As we have seen, for Fish the academic job is the pursuit of truth and the
advancement of knowledge regarding matters identiﬁed as signiﬁcant by
existing disciplinary traditions. He then argues that academic freedom gets its
content and its justiﬁcation from the nature of the academic job; it is nothing
but the freedom necessary to do the academic job. That job requires academics
to follow their evidence and arguments wherever they lead, no matter who
might be dismayed or disadvantaged by their conclusions. Therefore, if you
want the academic job done, you must guarantee to academics the freedom to
follow evidence and arguments to their disciplinary conclusions without being
subject to pressure from non-academics such as university administrators and
80.
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trustees, politicians, businessmen, parents of students, or “public opinion.”
This is the minimalist, deﬂationary account of academic freedom that he
describes and defends in Versions of Academic Freedom as the “It’s just a job”
school.83 Academic freedom can be guaranteed by an employment contract,
or by a statute, as in New Zealand,84 but on Fish’s argument these legal
devices merely memorialize and reinforce a right that must already exist if the
academic job exists.
You start with the idea of pursuing a line of inquiry to whatever conclusion
it brings you, and then you ask for the freedom to engage in that pursuit
without interference from external forces that would tie you to the agendas of
another enterprise. The freedom you ask for is not added on to the project; it
is constitutive of it, for you can’t follow where an inquiry takes you if obstacles
are constantly put in your way. When all is said and done, academic freedom
is just a fancy name for being allowed to do your job, and it is only because
that job has the peculiar feature of not having a pre-stipulated goal that those
who do it must be granted a degree of latitude and ﬂexibility not granted to
the practitioners of other professions, who must be responsive to the customer
or to the bottom line or to the electorate or to the global economy.85

Academic freedom is quite distinct from freedom of speech, according to
Fish. The right of freedom of speech applies to everyone, whereas academic
freedom applies only to those few people engaged in academic work. The right
of freedom of speech protects speech without regard to its content (with some
limited exceptions), but academic freedom is not indiﬀerent to content. A lot
of content can be excluded from the academic context on academic grounds,
and this will not violate academic freedom.
Here we see a diﬀerence between the First Amendment and academic
freedom. The First Amendment stands for the proposition that all points of
view must be given a hearing and none excluded; and while academic freedom
also insists that ideas should be given a hearing, it erects a barrier that must
be negotiated before a particular idea is welcomed into the conversation as
a legitimate participant; it must pass muster before a body of credentialed
experts; and if it does not, it will be sent away without apology and without
any philosophical or moral anxieties. The academy is not a democracy; it is a
structure of authority, and it is in the business of excluding what it has judged
to be unworthy.86
83.
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While freedom of speech is an important political value in a liberal society,
Fish acknowledges, it is not an important academic value.87 A primary goal
of freedom of speech is to facilitate political speech, “[b]ut in the academy,
political urgings are oﬀ-limits. . . . This is particularly the case in the
classroom, where any eﬀort at political (as opposed to intellectual) persuasion
is called indoctrination and is rightly rejected.”88 Freedom of speech has a
constitutional foundation in America, but academic freedom does not—it is
just the prerequisite for doing one particular job.89 Indeed Fish concludes
that, apart from employment contracts, “it is not at all clear that academic
freedom has any substantial presence in the law.”90
Academic freedom, on Fish’s analysis, is a group right rather than an
individual right. It is the right of a group engaged in a particular job to do
that job without interference by outsiders, and to be the only ones who have
the jurisdiction to regulate the doing of that job.
The professional concept of academic freedom is the product of the guild’s
desire (shared with other guilds) to order its own aﬀairs with a minimum
of interference from the outside; academic freedom is the freedom, ﬁrst, to
pursue professional goals, and, second, to specify for itself the appropriate
means of realizing those goals. The profession is jealous of its prerogatives
and reluctant to yield them to other authorities, including the authority of
the courts.91

It follows that academic freedom does not give to individual academics the right
to act against the norms of the professional group. Instead it gives to individual
academics the right to be subject only to the norms of the professional group,
and not to the norms and demands of any non-academic constituencies. Fish
adopts Robert Post’s formulation that academic freedom, as it applies to an
individual, “is best understood ‘as the unimpeded application of professional
norms of inquiry.’”92
If academic freedom is assigned to the college or university, the scope of the
individual faculty member’s freedom is limited ﬁrst by the norms embodied
in the particular institution’s regulations, and ultimately by the norms that are
said, by tradition and disciplinary authority, to deﬁne the academic enterprise
in general.93
25, 2013, 9:00 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/25/academic-freedomin-brooklyn-part-two/ [hereinafter Fish, Academic Freedom in Brooklyn Two].
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Academic freedom therefore will not cover behavior that violates professional
norms or is subversive of the university’s core rationale. Fish argues that
academics themselves have to be vigilant to maintain academic standards and
to discipline and, if necessary, expel those members of the professional group
who violate them.94 It is this vigilance that he notes and approves of in the
expulsion and exclusion of Holocaust deniers from history departments, even
if they have professional qualiﬁcations. (He criticizes the attempt to justify this
expulsion only on epistemological grounds instead of nakedly professional
ones.)95 But a lack of clarity in thinking about the academic job and academic
freedom has, he believes, resulted in not enough of the necessary vigilance
being exercised. Too often academic freedom is thought of as the right of an
individual academic to do whatever he or she wants, without any constraints.
Thus an academic who refuses to teach the advertised content for a course,
and instead ﬁlls it with calls to engage in radical political action against the
existing social order (“academic squatting”) has been able to defend it as an
exercise of his academic freedom.96 Fish holds that such confused thinking
about academic freedom will come at a cost. In The Chronicle of Higher Education
he identiﬁed two costs, one external and the other internal:
The external consequence was warned against in the American Association
of University Professors’ 1915 General Report Of The Committee On
Academic Freedom And Academic Tenure: “If this profession should prove
itself unwilling to purge its ranks of the incompetent and the unworthy, or to
prevent the freedom which it claims in the name of science from being used
as a shelter for ineﬃciency, for superﬁciality, or for critical and intemperate
partisanship, it is certain that the task will be performed by others.” . . . But
the internal danger is more to be feared and is more often realized. It is the
danger of dysfunction and its attendant evils—unhappiness, bitterness, loss
of morale, stagnation. When someone is not pulling his or her weight, the
burden falls to others who, as responsible persons, will take up the slack
but with a (justiﬁable) sense of unfairness. If this goes on for a long time
as it often does, the entire operation of a department will be deformed as
everyone gets into the bad habit of working around the colleague no one is
willing to discipline. And the longer a “rogue” faculty member “gets away
with it,” the more diﬃcult it will be to turn around a situation to which all
have contributed.97

The limited nature of academic freedom on Fish’s analysis has other
consequences that are worth noting brieﬂy. Academic freedom gives academics
no right to participate in the governance of the university, nor to criticize the
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university administration (“intramural criticism”), because these things are
not necessary to do the academic job.98 Students have no academic freedom,
because they are not professionals engaged in the academic job. “The only
freedom students rightly have is the freedom to vote with their feet if they
don’t like the syllabus in a particular course,” and the only right they have is
“the right to competent and responsible instruction.”99 Extracurricular events
do not involve academic freedom issues, because such events are, by deﬁnition,
outside the teaching and researching that constitutes the academic job. So
there are no academic freedom issues raised when a controversial person is
invited onto the campus to give a graduation address or public lecture or to
receive an honorary degree. Nor are academic freedom issues raised if this
person is subsequently un-invited. The only issue Fish sees here relates to the
wisdom of the people doing the inviting and uninviting, because the image
and reputation of the university can be harmed by their actions.100 Similarly
he does not see academic freedom issues being raised by what is published or
denied publication in student newspapers.101
The rest of this book is devoted to describing and dispatching four competing
schools of academic freedom. The ﬁrst of these is the “For the common good”
school, “in which professional values are subordinated to the higher values
of democracy or justice or freedom; that is, to the common good.”102 In other
words, academic freedom does not aim simply to advance the academic
enterprise; it has the broader goal of beneﬁting society. The section in the
New Zealand Education Act (1989) that said that a university must accept “a
role as critic and conscience of society”103 is an expression of this conception of
academic freedom. The next is the “Academic exceptionalism or uncommon
beings” school.104 This position augments the “For the common good” school
by claiming that academics have special qualities that enable them to act for
the common good, and this entitles them to special rights that are guaranteed
under the heading of academic freedom. The “Academic freedom as critique”
school does see academic freedom operating within the academy, but in a
negative way. Rather than being used to advance the academic enterprise,
98.
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academic freedom should be used to deconstruct the presuppositions of the
academic enterprise.
One should not rest complacently in the norms and standards presupposed
by the current academy’s practices; one should instead interrogate those
norms and make them the objects of critical scrutiny rather than the baseline
parameters within which critical scrutiny is performed. Academic freedom is
understood by this school as a protection for dissent and the scope of dissent
must extend to the very distinctions and boundaries the academy presently
enforces.105

Finally the “Academic freedom as revolution” school takes the activity of deep
negative critique developed by the previous school and directs it at society as
a whole, rather than just at particular academic disciplines. For the members
of this school, society does not merely need to have an external critic and
conscience prodding it to do better now and again. Instead the job of the
academic is to expose the defective ideological assumptions that underpin
our unjust society and that foster oppression and exploitation. But simply
describing this state of aﬀairs is not enough; the academic must act forcefully
to change it, and must seek to encourage the students to do likewise. Academic
freedom, according to this school, protects the ability of the academic to
engage in this radical and critical political work.106
As I have shown in the previous section, Fish has developed six general
arguments against the position that the academic job should be expanded
beyond the core disciplinary task he described. All of these arguments could
be used to challenge the rival schools on academic freedom, because all four
of these schools originate in more expansive conceptions of the academic
job.107 In Versions of Academic Freedom he also adopts the strategy of identifying
and critiquing particular people who have sought to advance one of these rival
schools of academic freedom either in their writing or by their actions. (For
example, Robert Post, Judith Butler, and Denis Rancourt.) His conclusion is
that all of his opponents fail to give adequate weight to the word “academic”
in the term “academic freedom.” Instead of seeing academic freedom as the
freedom to carry out a distinctively academic practice without interference from
outsiders, they all see it as a freedom to do something more than participate in
a disciplinary tradition.
“To me, academic freedom has always meant the right to insist that academic
freedom be more than academic.” [Howard Zinn.] This declaration has the
virtue of illustrating just how the transformation of academic freedom from
a doctrine insulating the academy from politics into a doctrine that demands
105. FISH, VERSIONS, supra note 1, at 12-13, 50-73 (chapter 4).
106. FISH, VERSIONS, supra note 1, at 13-15, 104-28 (chapter 6).
107. See, e.g., id. at 127 (“A capacious deﬁnition of academic freedom, urged in the name of social
justice and human solidarity, undermines both academic freedom and the very idea of
academic life.”).
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of academics blatantly political actions is managed. What you do is diminish
(ﬁnally to nothing) the limiting force of the adjective “academic” and at
the same time put all the emphasis on freedom (which should be re-written
FREEDOM) until the academy loses its distinctive status and becomes just
one more location of a universal moral/political struggle.108

Justifying the Academic Job
Fish’s deﬂationary description of the academic job and academic freedom
achieves clarity, but this comes at a cost. Academic freedom is declared to be
necessary to get the academic job done, but why does the narrow academic job
Fish describes need to be done at all? If the academic job involved elevating
the character of students, or improving democratic functioning, or achieving
social justice, or providing employment or useful goods and services, then
it would not be diﬃcult to justify to non-academics. But if the correct
description of the academic job makes reference to none of these things, why
should anyone other than those already embedded in a disciplinary practice
care about it? It is to Fish’s credit that he goes down the deﬂationary road
right to the end and grasps this nettle ﬁrmly and without evasion:
Who is going to pay for the puriﬁed academic enterprise that I celebrate in
these pages? . . . . How do you sell to legislators, governors, trustees, donors,
newspapers, etc., an academy that marches to its own drummer, an academy
that asks of the subjects that petition for entry only that they be interesting, an
academy unconcerned with the public yield of its activities, an academy that
puts at the center of its operations the asking of questions for their own sake?
How, that is, do you justify the enterprise? . . . . The only honest thing to do
when someone from the outside asks “what use is this venture anyway?” is to
answer “none whatsoever,” if by “use” is meant (as it always will be) of use to
those with no investment in the obsessions internal to the profession.109

Not only does Fish grasp this nettle, he waves it about enthusiastically:
And here we come to the heart of the matter, the justiﬁcation of liberal
education. You know the questions: Will it beneﬁt the economy? Will it
fashion an informed citizenry? Will it advance the cause of justice? Will it
advance anything? Once again the answer is no, no, no, and no.110
If the point of liberal arts education is what I say it is—to lay out the history
and structure of political and ethical dilemmas without saying yes or no to any
108. Stanley Fish, Academic Freedom Against Itself: Boycotting Israeli Universities, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR
(Oct. 28, 2013, 7:00 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/10/28/academicfreedom-against-itself-boycotting-israeli-universities/. See also FISH, VERSIONS, supra note 1, at
109.
109. FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 153-54. See also FISH, VERSIONS, supra note 1, at 127.
110. FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 55.
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of the proposed courses of action—what is the yield that justiﬁes the enormous
expenditure of funds and energies? Beats me!111
What can you say to the tax-payer who asks, “What good does a program in
Byzantine art do me?” Nothing.112

Fish is aware that this nettle will probably appear pleasing to nobody but
him. (In Versions of Academic Freedom he says of the “It’s just a job” school that it
“may have only one member and you’re reading him now.”113) Surely, it will be
objected, the humanities at least teach critical thinking and analytical skills
that are useful in other contexts. Sure, replies Fish, but these things can be
taught in many venues; the academy is not necessary for them to ﬂourish.
So two cheers for critical thinking, but the fact that you can learn how to do it
in any number of contexts means that it cannot be claimed for the humanities
as a special beneﬁt only they can supply. Justiﬁcation requires more than
evidence that a consumer can get a desirable commodity in your shop, too; it
requires a demonstration that you have the exclusive franchise.114

Fish is not saying that the academic job cannot be given any justiﬁcation;
he is saying that the justiﬁcation can refer only to the goals and values of the
academic job itself, and the pleasures experienced by academics in advancing
those goals and values.
Nguyen Chau Giao asks, “Dr. Fish, when was the last time you read a poem
. . . that so moved you to take certain actions to improve your lot or others?”
To tell the truth, I can’t remember a single time. But I can remember countless
times when I’ve read a poem (like Herbert’s “Matins”) and said “Wow!” or
“Isn’t that just great?” That’s more than enough in my view to justify the
enterprise of humanistic study, but I cannot believe, as much as I would like
to, that the world can be persuaded to subsidize my moments of aesthetic
wonderment.115

To put the position more generally, the justiﬁcation (and criticism) of any
practice has to be internal. It has to use the modes of reasoning and the
conceptions of evidence and the criteria of excellence that the practice already
recognizes. Although I cannot expand upon it here, this is a reﬂection of
111.

Fish, Always Academicize, supra note 27.

112. Stanley Fish, The Crisis of the Humanities Oﬃcially Arrives, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (Oct. 11, 2010,
9:00 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/11/the-crisis-of-the-humanitiesoﬃcially-arrives/?_r=0 [hereinafter Fish, Crisis of Humanities].
113.

FISH, VERSIONS, supra note 1, at 9.

114. Stanley Fish, The Uses of the Humanities, Part Two, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (Jan. 13, 2008, 9:30
PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/01/13/the-uses-of-the-humanities-parttwo/ [hereinafter Fish, Uses of Humanities Two].
115.

Id.
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Fish’s commitment to the autonomy of practices, which in turn follows from
his anti-foundationalism:116
Each practice is answerable to the norms implicit in its own history and
conventions. . . . [J]ustiﬁcation can only proceed within that history and in
relation to those conventions. . . . Justiﬁcation is always internal and can only
get oﬀ the ground if the value it seeks to uncover or defend is presupposed and
is (surreptitiously) guiding the process at the end of which it is triumphantly
revealed. Justiﬁcation never starts from scratch, and can only begin if
everything it seeks to demonstrate is already taken for granted.117

Justiﬁcation (and criticism) of the academic job therefore cannot refer to
the goals and values of other institutions or practices, such as democracy
or religion or commerce. Fish is particularly dismissive of any attempt to
understand academia by using the values and paradigms of commerce.
“Higher education is just not in the same business as business,” he insists.118
Students should not be analogized to “consumers” of what the university
“produces,” because unlike the consumers of cars, “the recipients of higher
education do not know in advance what they need. If they did, they wouldn’t
need it, and what they often want, at least at the outset, is an education that
will tax their energies as little as possible.”119 Academics therefore should not
pay any attention to what students want when they design and teach a course.
Nor should universities disestablish traditional academic departments, such
as classics, on the grounds that they attract few students, as an automobile
manufacturer might stop producing a model that does not sell well.120
[I]n the academy there is no product except knowledge, and that may take
decades to develop, if it develops at all. The concept of market share is
inapposite; eﬃciency is not a goal; and there is no inventory to put on the
shelves. Instead the norms are endless deliberations, explorations that may
go nowhere, problems that only ﬁve people in the world even understand,
lifetime employment that is not taken away even when nothing is achieved,
expensively labor-intensive practices and no bottom line. What is an outsider
to make of that? Not much, because he or she will lack the internalized
understanding that renders the features of the enterprise intelligible, and in
the absence of that understanding, the wanderer in a strange land will see only
anomalies and mistakes that should be corrected.121
116. ROBERTSON, STANLEY FISH, supra note 10, at 60-64.
117.

FISH, PROFESSIONAL, supra note 2, at 112-13. See also FISH, VERSIONS, supra note 1, at 22-25, 132;
Fish, Scholarship and Politics, supra note 39; Fish, Crisis of Humanities, supra note 112.

118. FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 108.
119. Id. at 159.
120. Id. at 158, 164-65.
121. Stanley Fish, Wanted: Someone Who Knows Nothing About the Job, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR
(Feb. 24, 2008, 6:25 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/02/24/
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Fish does not see the fact that justiﬁcation always has to be internal as a
limitation on our ability to defend the academic job. Rather, he understands
the robust refusal to consider external values and goals to be the best and most
principled way to defend the academic job.
To the question “of what use are the humanities?,” the only honest answer
is none whatsoever. And it is an answer that brings honor to its subject.
Justiﬁcation, after all, confers value on an activity from a perspective outside
its performance. An activity that cannot be justiﬁed is an activity that refuses
to regard itself as instrumental to some larger good. The humanities are their
own good.”122

Trying to justify academia (or any practice) by appealing to the values of an
outside practice is self-defeating. Before you begin you have already conceded
to your opponent that your practice has no inherent value and makes sense
only when viewed through the lens of something else:
I believe that the demand for justiﬁcation should be resisted because it is
always the demand that you account for what you do in someone else’s
terms, be they the terms of the state, or of the economy, or of the project
of democracy. “Tell me, why should I as a businessman or a governor or a
preacher of the Word, value what you do?” There is no answer to this question
that does not involve preferring the values of the person who asks it to yours.
The moment you acquiesce to the demand for justiﬁcation, you have lost the
game, because even if you succeed, what you will have done is acknowledge
that your eﬀorts are instrumental to some external purpose; and if you fail, as
is more likely, you leave yourself open to the conclusion that what you do is
really not needed.123

But this severely minimalist position cannot stand unqualiﬁed. There are
two diﬀerent questions in play here, as Fish acknowledges: “The person who
asks you to justify what you do is not saying, ‘tell me why you value the activity,’
but ‘convince me that I should.’”124 That is, “why do you do it?” is one question,
and “why should I help you do it?” is another. Fish has argued that one can
answer the ﬁrst question only by referring to values, goals, and pleasures
entirely internal to academic practice. As for the second question, he says
that it is better not to answer it at all. But while proudly declining to defend
the academic enterprise to an outsider may be justiﬁed and praiseworthy in
some contexts (a dinner party, perhaps), it would be disastrous in others. In
particular it would be disastrous to refuse to defend the academic project to
122. Fish, Will Humanities Save Us?, supra note 23. But note the clariﬁcation that comes in Stanley
Fish, Uses of Humanities Two, supra note 114 (“Note that what we’re talking about here is the
study, not the production, of humanistic texts. The question I posed in the column was
not do works of literature, philosophy and history have instrumental value, but does the
academic analysis of works of literature, philosophy and history have instrumental value.”).
123. Fish, Always Academicize, supra note 27. See also FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 56-57, 59, 104; FISH,
VERSIONS, supra note 1, at 49.
124. FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 154.
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those whose help the academy needs, or who have the power to harm the
academic project.
Fish, the former dean, knows this well. He knows that “no form of
[academic] work—including even the work of, say, natural science—stands
apart from the political, social and economic concerns that underlie the
structures and practices of a society.”125 That is, the success of the academy
depends upon favorable conditions existing outside the academy. Some
non-academic institutions have to be prepared to fund the university, and to
maintain strong inhibitions against interfering with the work of academics as
they pursue their disciplinary truths. But there will always be competing views
about where the government or a foundation should spend its money, and
how closely it should concern itself with the activities of those who receive its
money. “It is no doubt true that a web of politics surrounds and undergirds
everything that goes on in higher education. Private and public sources fund
colleges and universities, and they could have chosen—and some would say
should have chosen—to fund something else.”126 So if external conditions
favorable to the university are achieved, this will be a political (in the broad
sense) success achieved against resistance from competing viewpoints. And, as
we shall see, Fish thinks academics should engage in this contest by defending
the university against external viewpoints that misunderstand or denigrate the
academic job.
It might seem that Fish is falling into a contradiction here. How can he say
to academics that they should defend the university against attacks, and also
say that “any justiﬁcation of the academy is always a denigration of it”?127 He
cleverly avoids any contradiction when he identiﬁes ways of defending the
academic job to outsiders that do not have recourse to non-internal goals and
values. One such method was described in Professional Correctness. An academic
can try to get the outsider to experience ﬁrsthand the pleasures of doing the
academic job. In that book Fish put on display the skills and pleasures of
a literary scholar working on the ﬁrst three words of Milton’s Lycidas, “Yet
once more,”128 and on a single line from Milton’s Paradise Lost, “And Devils
to adore for Deities.”129 With enormous erudition he draws out the multiple
meanings and histories that sit behind these few words, in the hope that by
displaying the academic job in action those attending to him will gain a sense
of its merits. But later, in Save the World on Your Own Time, he seems to have given
up on this approach:
[I]t won’t work to explain the academic world to nonacademics while standing
on one foot. That is, you can’t in a short time teach people to value activities
125. Fish, Ivory Tower, supra note 11.
126. Fish, Closing Argument, supra note 14.
127. FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 154.
128. FISH, PROFESSIONAL, supra note 2, at 4-17.
129. FISH, PROFESSIONAL, supra note 2, at 108-14.
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they have never engaged in. . . . Remember, it takes four or more years to
initiate students into the pleasures of the academic life, and in many cases the
eﬀort is not successful. Why should anyone think that the lessons could be
taught and accepted in twenty minutes?130

Fish identiﬁes a second consistent method for defending the academic job
in Save the World on Your Own Time by applying the maxim that the best defense
is a good oﬀense. He urges academics to stop being so meek and mild in the
face of attacks on the academic job. Instead of being passive victim types,
academics should go on the front foot and club the challenger with the fact
that he or she is not an insider, and therefore knows nothing at all about the
matter under discussion. Challengers should be told to shut up and leave the
academic professionals alone to get on with the job. Fish advocates
embracing the fact that few nonacademics understand what we do and why we
do it, and turning it into a weapon. Instead of saying, “Let me tell you what
we do so that you’ll love us,” or “Let me explain how your values are really our
values too,” say, “We do what we do, we’ve been doing it for a long time, it has
its own history, and until you learn it or join it, your opinions are not worth
listening to.” Instead of defending classics or French literature or sociology,
ask those who think they need defending what they know about them, and if
the answer is “not much” . . . suggest, ever so politely, that they might want
to go back to school. Instead of trying to justify your values (always a weak
position), assume them and assume too your right to deﬁne and protect them.
And when you are invited to explain, defend, or justify, just say no.131

He oﬀers his own conduct as a model for what can be achieved in this
manner. His side of the public debates he conducted with Dinesh D’Souza are
recorded in chapters 3 to 7 of There’s No Such Thing as Free Speech . . . and It’s a Good
Thing, Too. In those debates Fish robustly defended the university against the
neoconservative attacks on it during the “culture wars.” He reports that when
he was Dean of the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences at the University of
Illinois at Chicago he refused to let a critique of the university by a parent or
legislator or government oﬃcial pass in silence.
I said many nasty things about members of Congress, Illinois state
representatives and senators, the governor of Illinois, the governor’s budget
director, and the governor-appointed Illinois Board of Higher Education. I
called these people ignorant, misinformed, demagogic, and dishonest and
repeatedly suggested that when it came to colleges and universities, either
they didn’t know what they were talking about or (and this is worse) they did
know and were deliberately setting out to destroy public higher education.132

He admits “[t]hat’s not the way senior academic administrators usually talk
to their political masters, but try it; you might just like it. And it might even
130. FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 164.
131.

Id. at 165-66.

132. Id. at 162. See generally 161-67; Fish, Crisis of Humanities, supra note 112.
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work. God knows that the defensive please-sir-could-we-have-more posture
doesn’t.”133
Fish also brieﬂy mentions a third mode of defense that takes a diﬀerent
course. Instead of refusing to justify the academy by using values and goals
external to its deﬁning job, he acknowledges that one could use such arguments
as rhetorical tools without believing in them.
True, Finkin and Post . . . contend that the product of academic work is a
higher social good that justiﬁes extending to professors degrees of latitude
and freedom others do not enjoy. But I think of this argument as more
strategic than substantive, as an attempt to add to the weapons the academy
might have at its disposal when the inevitable attacks come. “For the common
good” is a good talking point and I can think of occasions when I might use
it myself, although I might have to bite my tongue.134

To the charge that this is a cynical and unprincipled way of proceeding,
Fish would reply that it is completely acceptable to use in a political context
arguments that you would judge to be defective in another context. If such an
activity is engaged in to advance one of your deep commitments (such as the
value of academic work), then it is principled and non-cynical.135
But there is a fourth way of defending the academic job that sits between
Fish’s second and third methods, and thereby avoids having to use arguments
that Fish would have to bite his tongue to employ. It is a method that is
suggested by many of Fish’s remarks, but that he himself does not take up.
As we have seen, Fish emphatically rejects the claim that the goal of academic
work is to improve the character of students, or achieve social justice, or
develop democratic skills, or increase the gross domestic product, or inculcate
an appreciation of our own and other cultures, and so on. He acknowledges
that sometimes examples of disciplinary work might achieve some of these
goals, but such eﬀects are always only contingent, accidental, and cannot be
planned. For this reason he dismisses them.
I’m not saying that there is no connection at all between the successful practice
of ethical, social, and political virtues and the courses of instruction listed in
the college catalogue; it’s always possible that something you come across
or something a teacher says might strike a chord that sets you on a life path
you might not otherwise have chosen. But these are contingent eﬀects, and as
contingent eﬀects they cannot be designed and shouldn’t be aimed at.136
133. Stanley Fish, The Crisis of the Humanities II, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (Oct. 18, 2010, 8:30 PM),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/18/crisis-of-the-humanities-ii/ [hereinafter
Fish, Crisis of Humanities Two].
134. Stanley Fish, How Odd?, supra note 8, at 183.
135. ROBERTSON, STANLEY FISH, supra note 10, at 162-65.
136. FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 13. See also FISH, VERSIONS, supra note 1, at 48, 131; Fish, Crisis of
Humanities Two, supra note 133. (“The mistake is to think that the line of justiﬁcation should go
from the pleasure many derive from plays, poems, novels, ﬁlms, etc., to a persuasive account
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Fish is very strict about what can be used to justify the academic enterprise.
For him it has to be “internal” in a very strong sense. It has to be a beneﬁt that
the academic job aims to produce deliberately, and it has to be a distinctive
beneﬁt that only the academy produces. (Remember his “two cheers for critical
thinking” earlier.137)
However, I think that Fish’s powerful deﬂationary thrust has caused him to
dismiss too quickly possible defenses of academic work that refer to its wider
beneﬁts without making those wider beneﬁts the goal of academic work. For
example, Fish argued that “[h]igher education is not valuable because of the
beneﬁts some nonacademics might see in it; that’s like valuing the theater or
art because they bring people into the inner city.”138 But surely it can sometimes
be very useful to point out that theaters bring people into the inner city if one’s
goal is to get non-theater people (such as a city council) to contribute money to
establish a theater downtown. Similarly, just because any wider social beneﬁts
of academic work are collateral (and possibly random) eﬀects of work done
to achieve completely diﬀerent goals, that does not mean that these eﬀects, if
there are enough of them, cannot be used to justify the academic enterprise
to outsiders for whom such eﬀects are signiﬁcant. This is a position that Larry
Alexander has advanced:
Fish is correct that academic work need not be intended to produce goods
extrinsic to disciplinary knowledge. . . . Nonetheless, good academic work,
even if not guided by extrinsic goals, does produce things of immense beneﬁt
to the world beyond the academy. . . . Indeed, if the academy did not serve
these external goals, even if indirectly as byproducts of academic work, there
would be no reason for the rest of society to support the academic enterprise.
. . . [O]ne can serve a goal without being guided by it; and in the case of
academic disciplines, one can best produce these extrinsic goods if one
is not guided by the aim of producing them. The argument is an indirect
consequentialist one, but it is nevertheless consequentialist. And Fish should
embrace it. In the end, his salary depends on others’ belief in it.”139

This line of defense is not based on grandiloquent claims about the beneﬁts
of academic work of the kind that Fish wants to deﬂate. It is not claimed
that academic work aims to produce anything besides the achievement of
disciplinary truths. The defense is based only on empirical evidence of some
unintended, non-academic beneﬁts that can be causally connected to academic
work. The fact that these collateral beneﬁts can sometimes be produced by
non-academic institutions as well does not undermine their usefulness in
defending the university, I would argue, contrary to Fish’s more restrictive
of how academic work enhances or even produces that pleasure. It may or may not, but if it
does, that’s an accidental beneﬁt.”).
137.
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138. FISH, VERSIONS, supra note 1, at 130.
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view. Nor need it be the case that all types of academic work will produce
such collateral beneﬁts, or that such beneﬁts will be produced regularly. But
if empirical investigation can identify enough such beneﬁts, and they are
suﬃciently widely spread among a variety of disciplines, they will be valuable
ammunition to use against those who seek to dismiss and undermine the work
of universities. However, if it were then argued that random, contingent social
beneﬁts from academic work were not good enough, and that academics
should be aiming to produce such beneﬁts regularly and in volume, the correct
response would be “No. Not only is that not our job, it is fundamentally
antithetical to our job.”
Would it not be a deﬂection from the academic focus of scholars to
constantly be looking outside their disciplines for any beneﬁcial unintended
consequences of their work? Quite possibly. Gathering such evidence is
a diﬀerent job from the academic job, and therefore it should be done by a
diﬀerent kind of professional. In Professional Correctness Fish makes the valuable
suggestion that universities hire aggressive public relations people to do work
like this.
I don’t mean the damage-control types found in most university publicrelations oﬃces, who are even more timid than their bosses and spend much of
their time keeping things out of the news. . . . No, I mean publicity-seeking types
who are always thinking of ways to grab huge hunks of newspaper space or air
time and ﬁll it with celebrations of the university. . . . The public justiﬁcation
of academic practices is too important a task to be left to academics; for after
all—and this has been my message from the beginning—when there’s a job to
be done, and you want it done correctly, call in a professional.140

If this suggestion were followed, then the next time you were asked to justify
or defend academia, you could say “No thanks. That’s someone else’s job.”
How Does Fish’s Analysis Apply to Legal Education?
We have seen Fish insist that the academic job is seeking truth and
advancing knowledge, but law schools are pragmatically concerned with
teaching practical skills and equipping students for employment outside
the academic environment. So are law schools too vocational to belong in
a university, according to Fish’s argument? Are they just oﬀering fancier
and more expensive versions of courses like “Transportation and Materials
Moving”? Fish recommended that purely vocational courses like this should
not be taught at a university, and he acknowledged that this exclusion could
apply to some professional schools too:
If this is, in fact, what transpires in a particular professional school—if students
are taught methods and techniques in the absence of any inquiry into their
sources, validity, and philosophical underpinnings—that professional school
140. FISH, PROFESSIONAL, supra note 2, at 126.
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is not the location of any intellectual activity and is ‘academic’ only in the
sense that it is physically housed in a university.141

However, Fish believes that law can very easily be “academicized” in the
fashion required to be a legitimate university discipline:
One can, however, make the case that the practice of law is more than a
technical/strategic exercise in which doctrines, precedents, rules and tests are
marshaled in the service of a client’s cause. The marshaling takes place within
an enterprise that is purposive. That is, law is more than an aggregation of
discrete tactics and procedures; it is an enterprise informed by a vision of how
the state can and cannot employ the legalized violence of which it is the sole
proprietor. That vision will come into view in the wake of a set of inquiries.
What obligations do citizens owe one another? How far can the state go in
enforcing those obligations? What restrictions on what the state can do to
(and for) its citizens should be in place? How do legal cultures diﬀer with
respect to these issues?142

In other words, it is possible both to teach law as a practice and also to
subject law to academic analysis.
Not only does Fish argue that law can be academicized, he also believes that
it should be academicized. The evidence for this is that he has devoted a lot of
time and energy to doing just that, both in his writing and in his teaching at law
schools such as Duke and Cardozo. He is particularly interested in subjecting
to academic analysis freedom of speech,143 freedom of religion,144 and contract
law.145 He thus joins in the eﬀorts of other legal academics who write books and
articles in which they seek not simply to describe the current state of a part of
the law, but also to explain how this current state developed out of past states;
how political and social and economic forces impacted on the development of
the law; how the law intersects with debates in philosophy and hermeneutics
and political theory; how the current state of the law is likely to change in the
future, and so on. As well as focusing on particular substantive areas of law,
legal academics sometimes engage in more general attempts to explain law
as a whole; to describe what sets it apart from other social institutions and
to make clear what its unique job is. H. L. A. Hart, Ronald Dworkin, and
Richard Posner are prominent jurisprudence scholars who have taken up this
more abstract academic exercise, and Fish has joined them too.146 He entered
141. FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 22.
142. Stanley Fish, Teaching Law, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (Dec. 12, 2011, 9:00 PM), http://
opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/12/teaching-law/. On law schools see also FISH,
VERSIONS, supra note 1, at 134-5.
143. STANLEY FISH, THE TROUBLE WITH PRINCIPLE (1999) at 75-150.
144. Id. at 153-275.
145. FISH, NO FREE SPEECH, supra note 5, at 141-168.
146. For an account of Fish’s substantial contributions to general jurisprudence, see ROBERTSON,
STANLEY FISH, supra note 10, at 177-334.
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into a decade-long debate with Dworkin147 and has also written in response
to Hart148 and Posner.149 He has developed his own distinctive jurisprudential
position which I have described elsewhere.150
But what about the views of a law student who is paying a lot of money
to acquire a professional qualiﬁcation, and who might consider the academic
inquiries that Fish values to be unnecessary and expensive luxuries? Recall
Fish’s earlier point that students should not be analogized to consumers,
because unlike the consumers of cars “the recipients of higher education do
not know in advance what they need. If they did, they wouldn’t need it, and
what they often want, at least at the outset, is an education that will tax their
energies as little as possible.”151 Therefore Fish would not give much weight to
what he would consider to be the uninformed views of law students as to what
legal education requires. He would also point out that if law students want to
obtain their law qualiﬁcation from a university, as opposed to a polytechnic or
an apprenticeship, then engaging with the academic study of law is part of the
process they must go through to obtain it.

147. See ROBERTSON, STANLEY FISH, supra note 10, at 251-86.
148. FISH, DOING, supra note 4, at 503-24.
149. FISH, NO FREE SPEECH, supra note 5, at 200-30.
150. See ROBERTSON, STANLEY FISH, supra note 10, at 287-304.
151.

FISH, SAVE, supra note 3, at 159.

